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Abstract 
Throughout this essay I attempt to bring into focus what I see as the thorniest point
of proximity between two giants in twentieth-century ontology; that is, the nature
of language in the delineation between human beings and animals within the work 
of Martin Heidegger and Martin Buber. I consider Heidegger’s conception of world 
in an attempt to understand how he sees the abyss—as well as the bridge—between
animals and humankind. Buber’s more encompassing view of being seems to be a 
fruitful catalyst for moving Heidegger closer to something at which he hints but 
from which he withdraws. By exploring the relationship among human beings, 
animals, and language, I hope to offer a way of encountering animal life that, 
although it speaks to Heidegger, is actually a way of being in the world that 
apparently was closed off to him. 
Essay 
What is the nature of language? What is the language of nature? 
Is it solely language that distinguishes human beings from animals, 
or is the difference between the two more substantive?  Eschewing 
both Aristotelian empiricism which sought to define human beings as
animals with reason and the Judeo-Christiano-Islamic tradition in 
which YHWH as creator-god placed human beings (created in the
image of the divine) in a superior and dominant position over dumb 
beings (who in turn received their names from their recently created 
lords), Heidegger seeks liberation “from the mechanistic conception 
of life” (Heidegger 1995, 189) as well as from the foundation offered 
by the Western philosophical tradition. The key difference between 
human beings and animals for Heidegger lies in the interrelated 
concepts of world and language.  Heidegger considers three specific 
beings in his discussion of world and language: stone, animal, and 
human being. His discussion of these three beings accounts for 
approximately one-third of the text of his 1929-30 lecture course 
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published as The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, 
Finitude, Solitude. The word-lessness of the stone reflects its own 
world-lessness.  Moreover, the animal that stands with human beings 
on the side of world is nevertheless deprived of that world.  
Heidegger further problematizes the relationship between animals 
and human beings in his 1946 “Letter on ‘Humanism,’” where he 
contends that non-languaged animals are ambivalently related to 
human beings: “on the one hand they are in a certain way most 
closely akin to us, and on the other they are at the same time 
separated from our ek-sistent essence by an abyss” (Heidegger 1998 
“Letter,” 248)—itself a “bottomless” world, a world with neither 
ground nor substance.  These essential traits make dumb animals
“the most difficult to think about” (248).  Yet the human being’s own 
relation to being (by way of language) is not necessarily any easier to 
grasp. Human beings both have a world and are world-forming, but 
this ability to form worlds cannot be reduced to the typical 
metaphysical relationship: that is, a human subject does not merely 
impose a form upon his or her objective world.  Rather, the world for
Heidegger is the clearing of being itself.  The worlding of the human 
being grounds him or her within being, informing the human being’s 
own being. 
Language, for Heidegger, is closed to the experience of dumb 
beings: “Because plants and animals are lodged in their respective
environments but are never placed freely into the clearing of being 
which alone is ‘world,’ they lack language” (248).  Animals are always 
already at home—lodged—within being; they do not stand out in the 
clearing of being like human beings do.  Heidegger defines language 
as “the clearing-concealing advent of being itself” (249).  But if there 
is no clearing for the animal in which to stand out (ek-sist) in the first
place, then the concealment of being by language becomes an 
unnecessary appendage or futile adjunct to the non-human animal: 
“living creatures are as they are without standing outside their being 
as such and within the truth of being, preserving in such standing the 
essential nature of their being” (248).  Being has always already 
arrived for the animal; there is no need to announce its advent by way 
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of language. Heidegger further explicates his notion of human ek­
sistence—the standing out in world, or the clearing of being—in his 
1949 “Introduction to ‘What Is Metaphysics?’”: 
The being that exists is the human being.  The human 
being alone exists. Rocks are, but they do not exist. Trees
are, but they do not exist.  Horses are, but they do not 
exist. Angels are, but they do not exist.  God is, but he 
does not exist…. The proposition ‘the human being exists’
means: the human being is that being whose Being is
distinguished by an open standing that stands in the 
unconcealedness of Being, proceeding from Being, in 
Being (Heidegger 1998 “Introduction,” 284). 
Putting aside the question of domestication and enculturation of 
animals—which is outside the scope of this essay—an exploration of 
Heidegger’s conception of world would be useful in attempting an 
approach toward the difficult thinking necessary to understand just 
what he sees as the nature of the abyss as well as the nature of the 
kinship between animals and humankind.  One wonders if it is
possible to begin to close this gap.  To this end, I would like to take up 
Martin Buber’s own ontological understanding of the relation 
between human beings and dumb animals in his 1923 I and Thou as a 
way of rethinking the fundamental Heideggerean question about 
language and non-human animals. 
World comes to the fore within Heidegger’s exploration of the 
humanity of human beings. Significantly, the etymological origins of 
world tend more toward time and historicity (as in “the age or life of 
man”: the medieval world, for example) than the currently standard 
conceptualization of location and positionality (as in “citizen of the
world”). In Heidegger’s use, however, world is never merely the 
earth as opposed to the heavens or the realm of the spirit; it does not 
indicate a realm of beings at all but rather “the openness of 
being” (Heidegger 1998 “Letter,” 266).  This use is not quite the same 
as that in his lecture course, where he proposes, “Let us provisionally
define world as those beings which are in each case accessible and 
may be dealt with, accessible in such a way that dealing with such 
beings is possible or necessary for the kind of being pertaining to a 
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particular being” (Heidegger 1995, 196). If world is defined—no 
matter how provisionally—according to accessibility of beings to 
other beings, then the dumb animal is not entirely deprived of it: 
If by world we understand beings in their accessibility in 
each case, if such accessibility of beings is a fundamental 
character of the concept of world, and if being a living 
being means having access to other beings, then the 
animal stands on the side of man.  Man and animals alike 
have world…. The animal thus reveals itself as a being
which both has and does not have world (199). 
This tension among human beings, animals, world, and 
language/silence is not unique to Heidegger.  But whereas Heidegger 
limits the animal’s access to language (“they lack language”), Buber 
opens up the possibility of standing in relation with dumb animals 
within language—or within the dialogue, to keep within Buber’s 
terminology.  In fact, Buber opens up the dialogue for all of nature— 
be it stone or tree—as well as the supernatural or divine.  Here, 
however, I limit the scope of my discussion to dumb animal as 
distinct from the languaged human being. 
Buber begins his text with a description of the world: “The world 
is twofold for man in accordance with his twofold attitude” (Buber 
1970, 53). This twofold attitude mirrors the two basic word pairs that
he can speak: I-Thou and I-It. While I-Thou can only be spoken 
“with one’s whole being” (54), I-It establishes a subject-object 
dichotomy and hierarchy where the subject is privileged, thereby
leading to the alienation of modern human beings.  A subject I cannot
expand into its fullness within the fullness of its relation to an other 
(who is also fully expanded within the self-same relation) if 
everything other is only objectified and treated or encountered as 
mere object (that is, as an It). 
For Buber, there is no difference between “being I and saying 
I” (54). But is Buber’s inter-subjectivity (that is, the I-Thou relation 
itself) yet another shoddy humanism that keeps human beings from 
the destiny of their being?  From my understanding of Buber’s text, 
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he does not resort to the anthropocentric fallacy of privileging human
beings over other beings: the Thou for him expands beyond the 
merely interpersonal to include nature, works of art, as well as the 
divine. Furthermore, Buber posits an ontology based solely on 
relation: “All actual life is encounter” (62).  In this way, he too 
dismisses subjectivity by favoring neither a subjective I nor a 
subjective Thou. Instead he privileges the mutuality of the relation 
between the two subjects, all the while aware that this ideal 
mutualism can degenerate into the monologic objectification and 
instrumentalization of an I-It.  I expands because Thou is boundless 
and wholly other (as opposed to being merely the other of the I).  The 
I does not exist except insofar as it is in relation to either a Thou or an
It. 
Buber maintains that the first sphere of relation is life with 
nature: “Here the relation vibrates in the dark and remains below 
language. The creatures stir across from us, but they are unable to 
come to us, and the [Thou] we say to them sticks to the threshold of 
language” (56-7). In the 1957 Afterword to I and Thou Buber 
expands his notion of threshold beyond language to that of mutuality: 
Animals are not twofold, like man: the twofoldness of the 
basic words I-[Thou] and I-It is alien to them although 
they can both turn toward another being and contemplate 
objects. We may say that in them twofoldness is latent.  
In the perspective of our [Thou]-saying to animals, we
may call this sphere the threshold of mutuality (173). 
Peter Atterton clarifies this expanded notion in his 2004 essay “Face­
to-Face with the Other Animal?” Atterton explains that Buber 
sought to distinguish the relation to nature from the 
relation that exists between persons through the 
introduction of the term threshold (Schwelle). The plant 
and mineral world (“from the stones to the stars” [IT, 
173]) were said to be at the “pre-threshold” (Vorschwelle) 
of mutuality; the animal at the threshold; and the human 
at “over-threshold” (Überschwelle) (Atterton 2004, 263­
4). 
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Only between human beings is complete mutuality possible, but 
everything in nature nonetheless has some capability for mutuality: 
“it is clear that the regions of nature—from rocks to plants to 
animals—are still defined in terms of their capacity for mutuality, and
that is presumably the reason why Buber felt he could simply revise
the twofold ontology of I and Thou [in his Afterword] rather than 
abandon it altogether” (264).  If this is the case, then Buber’s dialogic 
ontology cannot be limited by the merely anthropocentric notion of 
dialogue, just as Heidegger’s language is beyond the merely 
linguistic. But is Buber’s threshold ontologically different from 
Heidegger’s abyss?  Can Buber’s threshold serve as a bridge between 
the human being and the animal, or between the world of the human 
being and the tentative, provisional world of the animal?  How is it 
that Heidegger is so eloquent a thinker when it comes to how human 
beings are able to stand in relation to architecture, poetry (poetizing),
works of art, and even to being itself, but he seems unable or 
unwilling to address the issue of human beings standing in relation to
other living beings, which is much of the focus of Buber’s work? 
At first glance, the abyss separating human beings from animals 
within Heidegger’s work seems to allow for the greater possibility 
that human beings can be seen as privileged subjects and that they 
remain in a dominant position within a hierarchy of beings, thereby 
reestablishing the Judeo-Christiano-Islamic creation myth.  The 
reestablishing of such a hierarchy, however, runs counter to 
Heidegger’s call to deep thinking about being and our experience of 
dwelling within the truth of being in the world. Within his thoughtful
delineation of the human being’s existence, Heidegger emphasizes,
“The proposition ‘the human being alone exists’ does not at all mean 
that the human being alone is a real being while all other beings are 
unreal and mere appearances or human representations” (Heidegger 
1998 “Introduction,” 284). Rather, Heidegger questions the 
questionability of such a hierarchy throughout his lecture course, 
insisting that even amoebae are no less perfect or complete than 
elephants or apes: “Every animal and every species of animal as such 
is just as perfect and complete as any other” (Heidegger 1995, 194).  
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Any difference that may exist between the human being and the 
animal, especially with an attribution of some specific difference to 
the human being, abandons “the human being to the essential realm 
of animalitas (Heidegger 1998 “Letter,” 246).  As far as Heidegger is 
concerned, we are on the wrong track if this is our method.  Instead, 
he wants to think humanism while not privileging the human, 
especially over being.  The human being is not the animal that has 
logos (as logic) but rather the (animal) being that lets him- or herself 
be gathered by logos (as legein). Just as Buber is aware of how easily 
the mutuality of I-Thou can collapse into the instrumentalized I-It 
relation of subjugation and dominance, Heidegger too considers how 
easy it is for the human being to stray away from his or her destiny of 
being. He warns that if we human beings do not allow being to 
inform us, we deform into something less than animal: “However 
ready we are to rank man as a higher being with respect to the 
animal, such an assessment is deeply questionable, especially when 
we consider that man can sink lower than any animal.  No animal can 
become depraved in the same way as man” (Heidegger 1995, 194).  
Human beings can become deformed when we privilege our grasp of 
information as if objective data and mere facts were an unconcealing 
of the truth of being. If indeed “knowledge is the remembrance of 
being” as Heidegger reminds us in “Anaximander’s 
Saying” (Heidegger 2002, 263), then, the memorization of mere 
information (as so-called objective fact) is being’s forgetting. 
We human beings also tend to forget the fact that our being is 
always already a being with. Heidegger defines the human being as 
one who is able to transpose him- or herself into the being of another 
human being. Even asking the question whether a human being can 
transpose into another is “fundamentally redundant”: 
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Insofar as human beings exist at all, they already find 
themselves transposed in their existence into other 
human beings, even if there are factically no other human 
beings in the vicinity. Consequently the Da-sein of man, 
the Da-sein in man means, not exclusively but amongst 
other things, being transposed into other human beings.  
The ability to transpose oneself into others and go along 
with them, with the Dasein in them, always already 
happens on the basis of man’s Dasein, and happens as 
Dasein.  For the being-there of Da-sein means being with 
others, precisely in the manner of Dasein, i.e., existing 
with others (Heidegger 1995, 205). 
It is the misperception of a gap that needs to be bridged between (and
among) human beings that leads philosophy astray into metaphysics 
and a calling for(th) empathy—a seriously flawed concept that posits 
a lone, solipsistic, singular subject who is isolated from others (206­
7). Here Heidegger pulls back from explicitly defining the Da-sein of 
the human being as a being also with other non-human beings, but he
leaves an opening into that possibility by “not exclusively” ruling out 
a transposition into the mute animal.  Is this “amongst others” a 
gesturing toward the possibility of a co-mingling of the human 
being’s world and the partial world of the animal?  Can the 
misperceived gap between human beings not also point toward a 
misperceived abyss between human being and animal? 
If we were to keep this possibility open—that being is always 
already a being with all other beings—then one can perhaps ask an 
even more difficult question: is there something human beings can 
learn from dumb animals? Can we begin to understand better our 
own (concealed) nest in being by thinking toward the animal’s nest?  
If a transposing into the animal is possible, how do we “translate” 
ourselves across the abyss in order to relate to our animal relations?  
Would such a transposition lead to a new elation (a new ecstasy vis-à­
vis ek-stasis) due to a closer relation to animals, a relation in which 
we human beings divest ourselves of our prelate positionality? Buber
suggests that we can indeed learn something from animals: 
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The eyes of an animal have the capacity of a great 
language. Independent, without any need of the 
assistance of sounds and gestures, most eloquent when
they rest entirely in their glance, they express the mystery 
in its natural captivity, that is, in the anxiety of becoming. 
This state of the mystery is known only to the animal, 
which alone can open it up to us—for this state can only be
opened up and not revealed....  This language is the 
stammering of nature under the initial grasp of spirit, 
before language yields to spirit’s cosmic risk which we call 
man. But no speech will ever repeat what the stammer is 
able to communicate (Buber 1970, 144-5). 
We human beings may indeed be separate from animals, and animals
may indeed be mute and unable to respond to language’s call.  But 
despite this, we nevertheless are responsible for animals—that is, we 
have in a Lévinasian sense the ability to respond to animals, to 
realize a response to them even within their muteness.  We allow 
animals to enter into relation with us within language—the house of 
being we share with all other beings.  Our responsibility for animals 
heuristically mirrors our responsibility to being.  Human beings are 
the shepherds of being.  “Shepherd” is informed by nature, by the 
nature of sheep.  The shepherd is he or she who gathers together the 
dispersed herd of sheep, the human being who gathers together that 
which disperses itself, namely, being (as physis). Our proximity to 
(the presence of) dumb animals offers a heuristic opening to the 
(absence of the) gods who for Heidegger speak the truth of being. 
Throughout his later work, Heidegger carefully divests us human
beings from our subjectivism, our techno-productionist views of the 
world, as well as our various forms of humanisms; that is, he allows 
no room for the privileging of the human being, particularly that over 
being. The human being—the only being that being languages—has 
his or her dwelling in being concealed by language.  This essence of 
the human being alone counters any argument that Heidegger 
somehow privileges human beings over other beings.  How could the 
homelessness of the human being indeed assert a privileged 
position?  Instead of just such a reassertion of the primacy of human 
beings, Heidegger seeks the human being outside metaphysical 
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systems that pay no heed to the ontological difference, that confuse 
being with beings. He has no need for systems that define human
beings simply in contradistinction to plant, beast, and God 
(Heidegger 1998 “Letter,” 246). One of the problems with humanism 
is that it comes to us by way of a Latin worldview; a Roman (mis) 
understanding of late Greek culture mediates our knowledge of Greek 
civilization (as well as of being).  All humanisms—whether Roman, 
Marxist, existentialist, or Christian—“agree in this, that the 
humanitas of homo humanus is determined with regard to an already 
established interpretation of nature, history, world, and the ground of
the world, that is, of beings as a whole” (245).  But for Heidegger, 
being, on the contrary, is the openness wherein the essence of the 
human being unfolds. Our entry into that openness is language, the 
“clearing-concealing advent of being itself” (249).  Being, as the 
clearing from which all physis arises, dwells within language. 
Language is not a purely objective phenomenon, however; it can be
manipulated, surrendering itself “to our mere willing and trafficking 
as an instrument of domination over beings” (243).  As being arrives 
in language, it does not simply become yet another being among 
beings. Instead, the ek-sisting human being—the one who stands out 
in the clearing of being—guards, preserves, sustains, and takes into 
“care” the clearing of being. 
Heidegger, however, is not purely anti-humanism.  Instead he 
offers an extreme humanism “that thinks the humanity of the human 
being from nearness to being” (261).  This extreme humanism 
depends on thinking the truth of being which in turn “depends upon 
this alone, that the truth of being come to language and that thinking 
attain to this language” (261). Every language, though, is always 
already susceptible to metaphysics.  Existing in namelessness then, 
for Heidegger, is a move beyond the metaphysics of language (toward 
an arche before the concealment of being within language): “But if 
the human being is to find his way once again into the nearness of 
being he must first learn to exist in the nameless” (243).  Heidegger’s 
own discarding of his key terms “hermeneutics” and 
“phenomenology,” he confesses to a Japanese interlocutor, was “in 
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order to abandon [his] own path of thinking to 
namelessness” (Heidegger 1971, 29).  Perhaps here Heidegger is 
pointing toward a way of being more originary than the myth of 
Genesis, prior to the naming of the “lower” animals which established
human beings as superior, thereby naming us their lords (instead of 
their shepherds).  Perhaps this is the lesson we can learn from dumb 
animals: if we humans can learn to exist in our own namelessness, 
then maybe we can somehow make the leap (Ursprung) past all 
shoddy humanisms throughout history and even past metaphysics 
itself to Heidegger’s own extreme humanism which thinks the human
being from within the nearness of being and as always already with 
and among all other beings. 
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